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3. Is corporate social responsibility an agency 
problem?
Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog
INTRODUCTION
Agency problems arise as a result of the different objectives of shareholders and manag-
ers, with the former expecting a fair return on investment and hence that firms maximize 
shareholder value, and the latter optimizing their personal pecuniary (and non-pecuniary) 
income. There are many internal and external governance devices that curb agency prob-
lems, such as pay-for-performance remuneration, contract design and internal monitoring 
by boards of directors and director committees systems (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1989; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010) and concentrated voting power held by monitoring 
blockholders and corporate governance regulation and institutions (e.g., Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; La Porta et al., 1998). In reality there is ample empirical evidence that 
many firms suffer from agency problems, for instance through poor design of managerial 
compensation contracts and lack of corporate monitoring, which leads to corporate 
investment decisions that do not maximize firm value (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).
Among a firm’s investment decisions are those on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
projects. As CSR comprises environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) 
dimensions, a shareholder could wonder whether, for example, promoting and investing 
in local communities, avoiding pollution, investing in water management, avoiding the use 
of low-paid (maybe even exploited) labor employed by suppliers of the firm or subcon-
tractors in the firm’s supply chain, or enhancing transparency on ESG-related projects, 
creates firm value (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2016). If  this were not the case, CSR 
investments that are negative net present value (NPV) projects should be considered 
as agency problems as argued by, amongst others, Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2016) who 
provide empirical evidence that managers do enjoy private benefits from investing in CSR. 
If  CSR investments do not yield benefits for the shareholders, then it is likely that the 
decision maker (the management) benefits from it in terms of monetary remuneration 
(if  CSR investments are related to his or her pay) or non-pecuniary income, through 
enhanced reputation as individuals who care about people and communities, access to 
charity events and celebrities, or increased media attention, all of which could advance 
managers’ careers (Krueger, 2015). In this perspective, engaging in time-consuming CSR 
activities is like robbing managerial time from managing the core operations of the firm 
(Jensen, 2001). Koehn and Ueng (2010) show that in spite of the fact that some firms are 
asked by external auditors to restate suspected earnings, investors still invest in these firms 
and seem to focus less on the operations if  those firms spend on corporate philanthropy. 
Masulis and Reza (2015) demonstrate that firms that maintain high levels of corporate 
giving have lower returns if  they have large corporate cash holdings, which they interpret 
as evidence of agency problems, a finding contested by Liang and Renneboog (2017a).
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An alternative view on CSR investments is that policies enhancing board diversity, 
employee satisfaction, environmental protection and so on, do generate returns above the 
cost of capital required by investors (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). So, investing in ESG 
issues – which essentially stems from a stakeholder view on the corporation – is consistent 
with a wealth-maximization goal, as stakeholder value enhancement may be congruent 
with shareholder value maximization (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2013). A growing strand 
of the literature concludes that CSR investments (as proxied by CSR scores) is value 
enhancing in the form of higher abnormal returns (Edmans, 2011). CSR investments are 
also often compared with paying an insurance premium, as these investments can avoid 
‘black swan’ events that could have a heavy negative impact on firm value. Lins, Servaes, 
and Tamayo (2017) show that firms with high CSR scores are more crisis resilient: their 
share price declines in 2008–09 were only half  of those of firms with low CSR investments. 
Furthermore, some studies find that high CSR firms have lower bankruptcy risk (Lee and 
Faff, 2009) and a lower cost of capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Albuquerque, Koskinen, 
and Zhang, 2017).
In this chapter, we attempt to answer the question of whether CSR investments result 
from agency problems within the firm or are consistent with the maximization of firm 
value. In addition to estimating the direct relation between CSR and Tobin’s Q, we try 
to identify the degree to which agency problems are present by measuring the degree of 
discretion the management has over cash flows (or put differently, the degree to which the 
firm is subject to shareholder pressure and monitoring), and the degree to which the man-
agement is incentivized to generate higher value. Discretion over corporate funds will first 
depend on how much of the cash flow is leaving the firm in the form of interest payments 
and dividends/share repurchases. High leverage ensures that the management does not 
pile up cash in the firm and is a bonding device in the sense that failure to service the debt 
leads to technical bankruptcy. Likewise, a high payout is a pre-commitment device; it is 
less strict than leverage because the payout can be reduced, but this usually comes at a cost 
as payout reductions and omissions are penalized by the stock market. Abundant cash 
in the firm induces managers to make investment decisions independent of the financial 
markets because they do not need to raise additional funds (La Porta et al., 2000). Direct 
proxies of the discretion over cash by management are the generated free cash flows, the 
cash holdings, and capital expenditures (CapEx) relative to industry CapEx.
In addition to the above capital liquidity measures, we also consider the incentive 
mechanisms with which to make value-enhancing investments by measuring the manage-
ment’s pay-for-performance, which is supposed to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders: agency problems may be less important in firms with a higher pay–(equity)
performance sensitivity (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In sum, we intend to investigate 
whether CSR investments are higher in firms where management has a low pay-for-
performance sensitivity, and in firms with a high industry-adjusted CapEx, low leverage 
and payout policy, and high cash holdings and free cash flow. If  in such firms – the ones 
where agency costs are potentially high – CSR investments are also high, there are reasons 
to believe that CSR investments result from agency issues, whereas high CSR in firms 
without those characteristics may suggest the opposite. In addition, we will perform a 
direct test of the relation between CSR and a market-based performance measure such 
as Tobin’s Q, while controlling for the potentially strong endogeneity concern (i.e., a firm 
is doing well because it is doing good or it is doing good because it is doing well). To do 
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so, we exploit the exogenous variation in country-level laws as instrumental variables for 
agency concerns. The relevant country-level laws are those that provide legal protection 
of shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 2000), such as corporate law, securities law, and 
regulation of related parties’ transactions (anti-self-dealing law), as well as the effective-
ness of their enforcement (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006; Djankov et al., 
2008; Liang and Renneboog, 2017b). If  these country-level laws help constrain firm-level 
agency problems, then being a firm in a country with such laws can be viewed as a strong 
proxy for lower agency costs. Furthermore, the agency concerns described above depend 
on the relative power of managers and shareholders. In firms with strong blockholders, 
the level of monitoring of the management is expected to be higher such that with low 
agency costs, CSR investments will be low if  they do not contribute to firm value and will 
be higher if  they do. For this reason, ownership concentration may potentially serve as an 
instrument variable for lower managerial agency problems.
In this chapter, we show evidence that CSR is not an agency problem because we find 
that firms with cash abundance – proxied by liquidity measures and financial constraints 
indicators – and with weak managerial remuneration incentives to focus on firm value, 
underinvest in CSR. CSR is measured by an overall CSR index and by its environmental, 
social, and governance dimensions. High CSR investments and performance are par-
ticularly prevalent in firms that seem to be well managed (where agency problems are not 
likely). We also demonstrate that when strong shareholder rights are embedded in corporate 
law, CSR performance is higher, which implies that when shareholders are more powerful 
relative to the management, the firms still make CSR investments. This finding suggests 
that CSR investments are not likely to destroy value. We also find a directly positive relation 
between CSR investments and Tobin’s Q, our measure for share price performance. Given 
the endogeneity problems when estimating a relation between CSR and firm value, we use 
an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which enables us to address causality problems. 
We find a causal link between high CSR and high Tobin’s Q, which leads to our conclusion 
that a firm’s CSR adoption is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We first explain how CSR is 
measured, which is followed by our methodological approach to estimate the relations 
between CSR and corporate value. We then explain the relation between CSR at the firm 
level and sustainability at the country level. Subsequently, we model the relation between 
CSR and agency costs and how this relation affects corporate value, which leads to our 
conclusions.
MEASURING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
We collect the CSR data from MSCI’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) database that 
comprises CSR rating metrics for a global sample of firms for which 29 CSR scores are 
available for the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) domains. Specifically, we 
consider:
 ● strategic governance, which relates to traditional corporate governance concerns 
and whether the firm adopts or has the ability to adopt certain strategic governance 
strategies;
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 ● human capital, which concerns labor relations as well as employees’ motivation and 
health safety;
 ● stakeholder capital, which concerns relationships with customers, suppliers, and 
local communities;
 ● products and services that relate to product safety and intellectual capital product 
development;
 ● emerging markets, which concerns issues related to human rights, child and forced 
labor, and oppressive regimes arising from firms’ trade and operations in emerging 
markets;
 ● environmental risk factors, which include historical liabilities to the environ-
ment, operating risks, industry-specific carbon risks, and performance in leading 
 sustainability risk indicators;
 ● environmental management capacity, which includes environmental audit, account-
ing, reporting, training, certification, and product materials;
 ● environmental opportunity factors such as the firm’s competence in embedding 
certain environmental opportunities in their strategies.
The data coverage spans the period 1999–2011 and comprises the largest 1500 compa-
nies from 59 countries that are included in the main MSCI stock indices of the developed 
and emerging markets. An important note is that the CSR data are measured relative to 
a firm’s industry peers (sectorial analysis), which entails that the scores do not depend 
on cross-country differences induced by regulation and other factors of the domestic 
institutional and economic environment. We also collect a cross-sectional dataset on 
country-level sustainability rating from Vigeo, which rates each country based on the laws 
and regulations that fulfill the country’s (1) environmental responsibility (commitment 
to and performance in environmental protection); (2) institutional responsibility (rule of 
law and governance); and (3) social responsibility and solidarity (commitment to protect-
ing human rights, political and economic freedom, and other social issues). These three 
country-level domains echo the firm-level ‘E’, ‘S’, and ‘G’, respectively, and we intend to 
compare the sustainability factors at the country level (which are mainly driven by regula-
tion) with those at the firm level (which are mainly driven by corporate choices). For a 
classification of CSR, we refer to Cumming, Dannhauser, and Johan (2015). The metrics 
of the Vigeo country-level sustainability index and the MSCI firm-level ESG ratings 
are different: the latter measures a firm’s CSR engagement and compliance, whereas the 
former measures a country’s legal and regulatory framework in sustainability and is thus 
not just an aggregation of firm-level CSR data.
METHODOLOGY
As described above, we use five variables collectively to proxy for agency costs: (1) capital 
expenditure (CapEx); (2) cash holdings; (3) free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), calculated as 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) after tax minus the change in net assets (CapEx, 
minus depreciation and amortization, plus or minus the change in net working capital); 
(4) dividend payout ratio; and (5) leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt over total 
equity. When the first three variables are high, we expect them to be related to agency costs 
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caused by excessive capital spending, and when the last two variables are high, we expect 
them to be related to mechanisms that can curb managerial agency problems.
Of course, the issue of endogeneity is important to consider. Country-level laws and 
ownership structures, as discussed, can help address this difficult issue by serving as 
instruments. The effects of law and ownership on the five agency proxies that we have 
described above have been well documented in the literature. For example, countries 
with better investor protection (e.g., common law countries) have significantly fewer 
cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003), lower free cash flows, lower 
investment sensitivity to cash flows (McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2012), higher leverage 
adjustment speeds (Öztekin and Flannery, 2012), and higher payouts (La Porta et al., 
2000). Given this, we conduct a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model in which the agency 
proxies are regressed on country-level laws and ownership concentration in the first stage. 
Subsequently, the predicted value of each proxy enters into the second-stage regression 
where CSR is the dependent variable. This model also includes other firm-level covariates 
(return on assets – ROA, equity market-to-book ratio, interest coverage, short-term 
investment to cash flow sensitivity, financial slack as measured by the current ratio). We 
also control for time fixed effects because CSR policies may vary over time.
The country-level legal protection data come from well-established sources. For the 
country-level laws, we use the anti-director rights index (ADRI), which was first developed 
by La Porta et al. (1998) and revised in Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). For 
securities law, we use the private enforcement index concerning information disclosure 
and liabilities standard developed by La Porta et al. (2006). Since public enforcement was 
not found to play a significant role in investor protection as in La Porta et al. (2006), we 
do not use it as an IV (the Sargan-Hansen test also suggests that it is not a valid IV). For 
the regulations on self-dealing, we use the anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) developed by 
Djankov et al. (2008), which contains ex ante control of self-dealing, ex post control of 
self-dealing, and public enforcement. As suggested by Djankov et al. (2008), the ASDI 
is better grounded in theory than the ADRI, and focuses more on insiders’ related-party 
transactions. We further include the one-share one-vote index (mandatory proportional-
ity of voting and cash flow rights) and the mandatory dividend index (percentage of net 
income that the company law or commercial code requires firms to distribute as dividends 
among ordinary shareholders) as used in Spamann (2010). We conducted the Sargan-
Hansen over-identification test on the overall validity of our instrumental variables: 
almost all test statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis that the IVs are valid. Therefore, 
our identification strategy and the results are robust. Given that our CSR scores are 
based on a comparison of ESG factors with industry peers (that is, the industry effect has 
already been eliminated by construction), we do not control for industry fixed effects but 
cluster standard errors at the industry level.
To test the relation between CSR and managerial pay-for-performance, we regress 
executive pay on the CSR indicators, the performance indicators, and their interactions, 
along with other firm-level and country-level covariates. In the literature, executive 
compensation is usually measured as both the cash-based pay (salaries and bonuses) and 
equity-based pay (stock options, restricted stock of long-term incentive plans). Therefore, 
the average total compensation (both cash-based and equity-based pay) of all available 
executives on BoardEx’s Compensation Reports is taken as our dependent variable. The 
main independent variables include the different ESG ratings, Tobin’s Q, and their inter-
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actions. Following the traditional literature on the determinants of executive compensa-
tion, we also include a set of control variables, such as ROA, the number of employees 
(Ln(Employee)) as a proxy for the physical size of the company, the leverage ratio as proxy 
for creditors’ involvement into the firm, the number of analysts following the company 
(Ln(Analyst coverage)) as a proxy for market discipline; the percentage of a company’s 
shares owned by the largest shareholder. Industry and time fixed effects are controlled for 
in all these regressions. The descriptive statistics of our variables are exhibited in Table 3.1.
COUNTRY-LEVEL SOCIETAL SUSTAINABILITY AND FIRM-
LEVEL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
We first correlate the country-level sustainability ratings – the country’s environmental 
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and social responsibility and solidarity – 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics
Variables MSCI IVA Sample
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Cash holdings (scaled by assets) 77 061 0.075 0.045 0.086 0 0.994
Free cash flows (scaled by assets) 65 728 0.059 0.057 0.073 –1.362 1.565
Capital expenditure (scaled by assets) 67 091 0.052 0.042 0.046 0 1.037
Dividend payout ratio 55 670 0.816 0.288 13.766 –70.176 598.420
Leverage ratio (winsorized) 78 004 0.615 0.613 0.208 0.228 0.955
ROA (winsorized) 74 993 0.050 0.043 0.044 –0.02 0.149
Equity market-to-book (winsorized) 76 417 2.820 2.247 1.875 0.790 8.045
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 72 949 0.677 0.445 0.688 0.042 2.702
Financial constraints (winsorized) 62 076 0.264 0.006 0.495 0 1.832
Interest coverage (winsorized) 73 948 17.093 5.975 29.411 0.414 122.817
Financial slacks (current ratio) 63 342 1.721 1.365 1.572 0.038 184.984
Ownership dispersion (rating) 71 331 7.818 9 2.436 1 9
Independent director ratio 31 019 0.719 0.727 0.175 0 1
Female CEO 74 996 0.014 0 0.119 0 1
CEO’s international work 74 998 0.437 0 0.496 0 1
CEO’s overseas education 74 986 0.195 0 0.396 0 1
Total compensation (thousand USD) 24 049 859.509 404.750 2559.806 5.417 75 001
Employees 71 697 41 917 17 245 82 271 0 2 100 000
Analyst coverage 67 289 14.421 13 7.852 1 54
Investment opportunities 67 049 0.093 0.047 0.797 –0.043 170.824
Blockholders’ direct ownership 54 746 0.356 0.231 0.339 0 1
Largest shareholder’s total ownership 37 005 0.229 0.125 0.233 0 1
Adjusted anti-director rights index 89 765 3.371 4 1.184 2 5
Anti-self-dealing index 89 947 0.617 0.650 0.212 0.170 1
Public enforcement of anti-self-dealing 89 947 0.197 0 0.339 0 1
Private enforcement of securities law 89 799 0.772 0.747 0.217 0.18 1
Public enforcement of securities law 89 799 0.606 0.667 0.318 0 0.896
Employment laws index 89 336 0.335 0.218 0.193 0.161 0.809
Collective relations laws index 89 336 0.370 0.259 0.171 0.188 0.711
Social securities laws index 89 336 0.688 0.646 0.074 0.177 0.873
Civil rights index 89 336 0.668 0.733 0.107 0.233 0.850
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with the firm-level CSR ratings from the MSCI IVA to verify whether sustainability 
of the country (mainly required by regulation) relates to the level of corporate social 
 responsibility (mainly induced by firm-level engagement). The Pearson correlation coef-
ficients between the firm- and country-level indices are shown in Table 3.2. On average, 
the coefficients are around 20 to 30 percent, which are high given that the country-level 
and the firm-level ratings use completely different rating metrics. For example, the high 
correlation between the firm-level social index and ‘country institutional responsibility’ 
implies that corporate behavior benefiting its employees and properly putting its human 
resources into service is largely governed by the rule of law and country governance (for 
example, corruption control, government efficiency, etc., as measured by ‘institutional 
responsibility’). Such high correlations also imply that our firm-level CSR measurements 
are closely related to societal sustainability issues and that CSR is not incongruent with 
the value-enhancing view of CSR. As a further validation, we correlate the CSR ratings 
of the US subsample with Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index (the 
E-index), which is believed to drive corporate governance quality. The E-index consists 
of six governance provisions, among which four arrangements set constitutional limits 
on shareholder voting power – staggered board, limits to shareholder amendments of 
the bylaws, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for 
charter amendments – and two arrangements relate to anti-takeover provisions: poison 
pills and golden parachutes. The correlations between the E-index and the CSR scores for 
our US subsample are rather low (merely 6 percent) and negative, which hints that CSR 
is not adopted by an entrenched management and hence expresses an agency problem. 
We perform a more thorough analysis of this issue in the regression analysis of the next 
section.
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND AGENCY COSTS
In Table 3.3, we examine the relationship between CSR and the agency concerns, proxied 
by CapEx, cash holdings, and free cash flows. The agency view predicts a positive relation 














MSCI IVA overall rating 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.26***
RiskMetrics EcoValue21 rating 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.25***
RiskMetrics social rating 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.26***
Note: The MSCI IVA rating, RiskMetrics EcoValue21 rating, and RiskMetrics social rating are firm-level 
ESG scores provided by MSCI IVA. The overall country score, country environmental responsibility, country 
institutional responsibility, and country social responsibility and solidarity are country-level sustainability 
indices provided by Vigeo. Overall country score is the average of the other three responsibility domain scores. 
*** stands for statistical significance at 1% level.
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between CSR and capital liquidity but a negative one between CSR and leverage, and 
CSR and payout, whereas the value-enhancing view on CSR predicts opposite relations. 
The agency concerns are instrumented by the country-level legal shareholder protection 
measures and the firm-level ownership concentration. That is, the aforementioned five 
agency concerns variables – cash holdings, free cash flows, capital expenditures (the first 
three are scaled by total assets), dividend payout, and leverage – are regressed one by one 
on legal protection and ownership concentration in the first-stage models. In the second 
stage, CSR ratings are regressed on the five predicted agency concerns variables estimated 
from the first stage, and on the other control variables with bootstrapping-adjusted 
standard errors. As we are interested in testing the CSR agency view, we only report the 
second-stage results. The dependent variables are the overall IVA ratings (covering all ESG 
dimensions), the RiskMetrics EcoValue ratings (focusing on ecological efficiencies), the 
RiskMetrics social ratings (focusing on social issues), as well as the three subindices that 
receive the highest weights: labor relations, industry-specific carbon risks, environmental 
opportunities, and three aggregate subscores: strategic governance (including traditional 
governance), human capital, and stakeholder capital.
The coefficients on the three capital liquidity variables – cash holdings, free cash flows, 
and capital expenditures – are mostly negative and statistically significant, whereas the 
coefficients on the dividend payouts and leverage are mostly positive. These findings do 
not support the view of CSR as an agency problem, and predict exactly the opposite. 
The economic significance is also quite large. We also find support for the ‘doing good 
when doing well’ hypothesis, as the coefficients on either ROA or market-to-book ratio 
are mostly positive. In addition, the financial constraint variable is mostly negatively 
correlated with the ESG ratings, while financial slack (as measured by the current ratio) 
is mostly positively associated with the ESG ratings. In terms of causation, the signs 
of coefficients ought to be interpreted with care. Still, given our identification strategy 
and the Sargan-Hansen’s test statistics that support the validity of our IVs, we tend to 
interpret them as follows: well-governed firms suffer less from agency concerns when cash 
is tight, that is, there are less cash reserves, free cash flows and capital spending, and more 
dividend and interest payouts. Consequently, managers are motivated to run the firm 
more efficiently, care more about the long run through engaging in CSR activities, and 
are more willing to disburse earnings to shareholders and other stakeholders.
In Table 3.4 we examine the relationship between CSR, executive compensation, and 
firm performance. The dependent variable is the average compensation of executives in 
the focal firm, and the independent variables include CSR scores, Tobin’s Q, and their 
interaction term, together with other control variables that are used in the previous 
literature on executive compensation. As mentioned before, the agency view argues 
that CSR as an agency problem will reduce managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity, 
and thus predicts a negative effect of the interaction between CSR and performance 
on managerial pay. That is, CSR is higher in firms with lower pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. The opposite view based on value-enhancing argument would argue that 
CSR strengthens pay-for-performance sensitivity, and thus predicts a positive sign of 
the interaction term. The results on pay-for-performance again reject the agency view, 
and provide support for the value-enhancing view. The coefficients on the interaction 
terms between CSR (overall IVA, environmental, social) performance and firm valua-
tion (Tobin’s Q) are consistently positive, which indicates that engaging in CSR actually 
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strengthens the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The economic effects are non-trivial: the 
effects of performance on pay (scaled by total assets) in more socially responsible firms 
(with one grade higher in CSR ratings) are on average 10 percent higher than less socially 
responsible firms. The coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant in 
the regression with social ratings as the CSR measure, which may imply that social issues 
such as human rights are relatively peripheral to firm performance, thus are not priced 
in managerial compensation. The coefficients on leverage are mostly negative, which 
confirms the disciplinary role of debt: leverage can reduce the likelihood of managerial 
entrenchment through monitoring by creditors and the threat that the CEO loses his or 
her job following bankruptcy-induced liquidation.
CSR, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
We further consider the association between CSR, agency problems, and shareholder 
value altogether in a cross-country setting, which has not been explored in the extant 
literature of ‘doing well by doing good’. To further justify the role of CSR in facilitating 
value enhancement and triangulate our previous results, we test whether CSR could 
counterbalance the negative effects of agency problems and poor corporate governance 
on firm value. To do so, we utilize the rich coverage of corporate governance provisions 
at the firm level from the ASSET4 ESG database, and construct a global entrenchment 
index (‘global E-index’) as a proxy for poor governance. Our global E-index is constructed 
following the structure of the original US-based E-index as in Bebchuk et al. (2009). The 
provisions in our global E-index include the presence of: (1) a poison pill; (2) a golden 
parachute; (3) a classified board; (4) other anti-takeover devices; and (5) supermajority 
requirements for both amending charters and amending bylaws.
We conduct our test on a panel dataset of more than 4700 largest public firms from 
60 countries in the ASSET4 sample over the period from 2002 to 2013. The dependent 
variable for all specifications is Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of market value of equity 
to the book value of equity and winsorized at the 5 percent level. The key explanatory 
variables are the global E-index, the CSR rating (which is measured by ASSET4’s overall 
CSR score, environmental score, and social score), and an interaction between the E-index 
and CSR (entrenchment index × CSR). If  CSR enhances firm value, it can counterbal-
ance the negative impact of managerial agency problems as proxied by the E-index. 
Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient of the E-index, a positive coefficient of CSR, 
and a positive coefficient of their interaction. We use standard financial controls, such 
as firm size (measured as Log(Assets)), the largest shareholder’s cash flow rights and 
its square, ROE, leverage ratio, capital expenditure, dividend per share, as well as year 
dummies, country dummies, and industry dummies (from Thomson Reuter’s industry 
classification).
The coefficients on the three measures of  our global E-index are mostly negatively 
associated with Tobin’s Q, which is in line with that of  the original E-index (Bebchuk 
et al., 2009) and confirms that our new index captures similar functions with respect 
to firm value (Table 3.5). The main effects of  various CSR ratings are mostly positive, 
suggesting that a higher CSR rating is associated with higher firm value. The most 
interesting results are on the interaction term between CSR and the global E-index: for 
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almost all CSR ratings (environmental, social, and overall), the coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant. This reinforces our earlier findings supporting the value-
enhancing view rather than the agency view, and suggests that CSR, rather than being an 
agency problem, can actually reduce the negative effects of  agency problems (managerial 
entrenchment) on firm value. Of course, potential endogeneity issues may still exist, 
and unfortunately there might be no readily single instrumental variable that captures 
all aspects of  CSR as well as ‘entrenchment’. Therefore, our interaction results should 
be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, corporate charters and bylaws are very stable 
over time (Bebchuk et al., 2009), which could partly eliminate endogeneity concerns, 
and the pure correlations between ‘entrenchment × CSR’ at least offer no ground for 
justifying the agency view.
CONCLUSION
Economic theories appear to predict that the Anglo-American version of capitalism, 
which hinges on the belief  of maximizing shareholder wealth, is the most efficient. The 
shareholders are the owners of the firm and managers have a fiduciary (i.e., strong) duty 
to act in their interests. Over the recent decades, models of capitalism have been gradually 
shifting from managerial capitalism – focusing on the power of managers originating 
from the separation of ownership and control – to financial capitalism, characterized by 
the criterion that shareholder value maximization is the firm’s ultimate objective and the 
predominating presence of institutional investors. In most Anglo-American countries, 
there is consensus that corporate governance is about giving a return to the providers of 
capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Corporate social responsibility, because of its nature 
of caring about stakeholders in addition to shareholders, is often considered as cash 
diversion and an agency problem. However, legal rules and ownership structures are very 
different outside the Anglo-American world, which significantly influences the executives’ 
incentives, the fiduciary duties of the management and the board of directors, as well as 
the decision-making process. While maximizing firm value is still the company’s raison 
d’être, such a goal may embed stakeholder value, not merely shareholder value, both 
in Anglo-American countries and in other parts of the world. The debate on the role 
of corporate social responsibility in value maximization and social welfare reflects the 
 varieties of capitalism and the boundaries of the firm.
In this chapter, we do not find empirical evidence that the agency view on CSR applies, 
as high capital liquidity (cash abundance) and a low managerial pay-for-performance 
sensitivity do not coincide with CSR investments as proxied by the overall CSR index and 
by the subindices that focus on the environmental, social, and governance dimensions of 
CSR. On the contrary, we demonstrate that CSR performance is higher when dividends 
are high, leverage is high, cash flows and cash holdings are low, and when there is a high 
managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. All these variables combined can represent 
managerial discipline in terms of investing. So, CSR investments are not performed when 
the firm is sitting on a pile of cash and does not have the right incentives to make value-
enhancing investments. We also find that CSR can counterbalance the negative effects 
of poor corporate governance on firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q); our instrumental 
variables estimation suggests that there is a causal link between good governance and 
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high CSR, which leads to our conclusion that a firm’s CSR practice is consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximization.
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